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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process at the
National Cooperative Refinery Association in McPherson, Kansas. The
implementation efforts provided data regarding leaders’ actions, employee
perceptions, and leadership alignment interventions. Research data gathered
through 129 paper surveys and 25 group interviews were analyzed to identify
relationships between work-related demographic indicators and workplace
attitudes. The final analysis revealed a statistically significant relationship
between the "alignment" composite and salaried employees, meaning salaried
employees were more likely to answer positively than hourly employees.
Secondly, the findings showed a strong association of "role of teams" where
employees on grassroots safety culture teams and the guidance team were more
positive than non-team members.
The key components of leadership alignment were found to be leaders’
actions, grassroots and guidance team structure, and leadership alignment
dialogues. When leaders followed safety policies and procedures, were visible to
employees, responded to safety concerns in a timely manner, and provided
detailed safety information, alignment was created. The leadership alignment
dialogues created alignment when leaders took the time to listen first to concerns
and not just react, engaged in honest and candid dialogue, and apologized for
making mistakes. The planned guidance and grassroots team structures and
projects were recognized by employees as maintaining the National Cooperative
Refinery Association’s safety culture change efforts. In conclusion, the safety
culture change process was successful, reducing the National Cooperative
Refinery Association’s incident and injury rates from 2008 to 2009. To continue to
improve safety performance, it is recommended the association continue the
team structure, complete leadership alignment dialogues with all supervisors,
and target specific units for safety improvement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Within the safety culture change process, there is a need for leadership
alignment to be established. Leadership alignment occurs when there is
consensus for the safety culture implementation strategy at various levels within
the organization from employee groups to supervision to upper management.
Leaders must gather employee perceptions to identify true alignment, assumed
alignment, forced alignment, or skewed alignment around the direction and
implementation of the safety culture change process.
Often, when implementing change initiatives, actions begin with aligning
the assumption leaders. Without establishing alignment, change efforts often fail,
costing organizations money, time, and trust. In the safety culture change
process, misalignment within the leadership levels manifests in incomplete safety
culture projects, lack of employee trust, unwillingness on the part of supervisors
to invest the time to understand the framework, and higher levels of resistance to
new cultural norms. If leaders are misaligned, organizations struggle to continue
the safety culture change process and miss the learning opportunities generated
by each team’s work, stunting much of the iterative safety culture change
process.
Creating shared leadership within the safety culture change process
through leadership alignment allows participation from all levels of employee
groups. Participation from all levels of an organization is uncommon in traditional
hierarchical organizations and provides a framework and language to confront
power, establishing positive conflict built on trust and respect (Katzenbach &
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Smith, 2003). The ability to challenge the underlying norms, assumptions, and
policies within an organization determines the depth and longevity of the safety
culture change process.
Flexible patterns of organization strengthen a system’s ability to
differentiate, integrate, and evolve, and leadership alignment allows
organizations to deal with external factors in the environment such as safety that
may impact an organization (Lund & Gjerding, 1996). World-class manufacturing
organizations view safety as a strategic business priority in line with quality,
production, and cost. Specifically, in the field of safety, the emerging business
paradigm has expanded the spectrum of managing safety to include safety
culture, a leading indicator of safety performance. Safety management from an
organizational culture perspective moves beyond managing from an engineering,
enforcement, and education perspective (Simon, 1999).
The field of safety culture emerged in the 1980s after several catastrophic
and public disasters. By looking at the perceptions, norms, and assumptions
within working groups, safety culture addresses the human elements of safety
and moves safety management from the lagging edge to the leading edge of
prevention. Safety culture work involves the entire organizational system to
address and prevent employee risks. As a result, successful safety culture
initiatives reduce employee incident and injury rates, reduce workers’
compensation costs, and increase employee engagement and empowerment.
Study Purpose
This study determined the key components of effective leadership
alignment within the safety culture change process. Specifically, it examined
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leadership alignment within the implementation of safety culture change process
at the National Cooperative Refinery Association (NCRA) in McPherson, Kansas.
The safety culture change process at NCRA was led by Culture Change
Consultants, Inc. It was one of NCRA’s strategic priorities to be recognized as an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration voluntary protection programs
star site for safety performance (U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, n.d.). Researching the implementation efforts of
NCRA’s safety culture change process provided data regarding leader’s actions,
employee perceptions, and leadership alignment interventions.
Safety culture change initiatives are successful when leadership at all
levels of the organization engage in creating an intentional safety culture. There
is a need to determine the key components of leadership alignment within the
safety culture change process to be more deliberate and knowledgeable about
how leadership alignment impacts specific implementation components and the
overall change effort within the safety culture change process. Determining the
key components of leadership alignment within the process may allow for
organization leaders to lower levels of resistance, increase employee
engagement, decrease mistrust, and continue change efforts with sustainability
in mind.
By involving the different employee groups, the data collected provided
multiple perspectives for analysis. Including the different groups enabled
assessment of how all groups are impacted by the level of leadership alignment
established within the process. This information was valuable to leaders within
the safety culture change process as they moved forward and continued to
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improve their safety culture and performance. The results also helped to
determine who was responsible for alignment, what actions create alignment,
and what data leaders should gather to determine if alignment exists within the
change initiative.
Research Setting
NCRA in McPherson, Kansas, began in 1943 when five farming
cooperatives purchased the facility from Globe Oil, who built the facility in 1932 at
a cost of $1 million. Today, the facility is owned by three member-owners: CHS
Inc., Growmark, and MFA Oil Company (NCRA, 2009). The plant is a highcapacity operation processing 85,000 barrels of crude a day into gasoline, diesel,
and propane. In addition to the production side of the business, the company
manages more than 60 trucks in the distribution network and more than 1,000
miles of pipeline. The cooperative supplies refined fuels to farmers across the
Midwest. With an employee base of 650, this organization produced a net
income of $567 million in 2007 (76.1% return on equity) and $273 million (35%
return on equity) in 2008.
NCRA’s strategic location in the middle of the Great Plains and its
connection to three pipelines that transport crude oil from Canada, the Rocky
Mountains, and the Southern United States and marine terminals provide a
market advantage. Additionally, the company is positioned close to underground
storage facilities and salt caverns, in Conway, Kansas. This allows the company
to control when it brings the product to market. In 2008, about 35% of the product
was loaded onto trucks and shipped to terminals, while the remainder was sold
directly as pipeline shipments. With the recent record profits, NCRA has begun
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several capital improvement projects including the Heavy Crude Expansion
Project, part of the clean fuels project slated for completion in 2010, which will
allow the refinery to tap into the 435,000 barrels a day of Canadian heavy sour
crude arriving in Cushing, Oklahoma (NCRA, 2009).
From a safety performance standpoint, over the past 3 years, the accident
rate at the refinery has decreased and NCRA was recognized with the Refiners
Association Gold Safety Award, along with the safety management award from
its majority owner, CHS, Inc. The structures in place to manage safety at the
refinery consist of a safety council of four people, the safety department, and a
behavior-based safety program. This structure is responsible for the employee
safety in 10 different areas across the facility including: OIP; MAP; Feed Unit;
Clean Fuels, Unicracker, Hydrogen Units (ALKY Unit); CAT Unit; R&F Unit;
Pumphouse, Truck Sales, Tank Farm, Conway Underground Storage (TCC);
Boilerhouse; and Maintenance. However, with a rate of 3.2 total recordable
incident and injury cases in 2008, NCRA’s safety performance was below the
petroleum refining industry average of 0.7 recordable injuries and illnesses per
100 full-time workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). Within the 3.2 total cases
figure, there were 1.4 lost time incidents, 1.8 restricted day and lost time
incidents, and 18.8 lost work days. From a safety management perspective,
NCRA’s safety performance had reached a plateau and did not include a safety
culture component. To improve its safety performance and continue reducing
safety incidents and accidents, the NCRA senior leadership, including both salary
and union employees, chose to implement the safety culture change process
facilitated by Culture Change Consultants, Inc.
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In August 2008, NCRA began the safety culture change process with an
Achieving World Class Safety workshop for employees. The workshop objectives
included enlisting and educating leaders, understanding the basic concept of
safety culture change, and creating buy-in for the process. In September 2008,
the Culture Change Consultants, Inc. safety culture assessment was
administered to 367 employees, followed by focus groups interviews with 20% of
the respondents to produce the NCRA safety culture assessment report. The
safety culture assessment report was fed back to 65 employees in November
2008 with the key findings, recommendations, and survey data. From the findings
of the report, NCRA chose to move forward with creating a safety culture
guidance team and safety culture grassroots teams as the structure responsible
for facilitating the safety culture change process.
Crucial to the success of this project was a safety manager at NCRA and
internal safety culture change champion who coordinated all activities on site.
The safety culture guidance team formed in January 2009 and consisted of five
salaried and four union employees, including the vice president of refining,
director of human resources, operations manager, safety manager, MAP
supervisor, the vice president of the union, and three veteran union members. In
March 2009, two supervisor awareness workshops were held to allow
supervisors and middle managers to learn about the safety culture change
concepts and ask follow up questions. There was some push back from the
middle managers about the commitment of senior level executives to stay the
course with the safety culture change process, and supervisor interviews were
held to clarify the supervisors’ perspectives. In April 2009, four safety culture

7
grassroots teams were chartered by the guidance team to work on safety culture
projects related to the findings in the November 2008 safety culture assessment
report. In February 2010, the first of three leadership alignment dialogue
sessions was held with 18 salaried employees, including the vice president of
operations and the vice president of refining.
The specific setting for this research was the employee group at the
NCRA. NCRA is in Year 2 of its safety culture change initiative and has
completed several safety culture change interventions including: the Achieving
World Class Safety Workshop, a Safety Culture assessment and report, a 2-day
Safety Culture Report feedback session, a leadership team meeting, formation of
a guidance team, two 1-day supervisor awareness sessions, supervisor focus
groups, formation of four grassroots teams, and a guidance team and grassroots
team health check. Additionally, NCRA has sent 76 employees to the Culture
Change Consultants, Inc.’s 3-day workshop “Implementing Safety Culture
Change through Grassroots Leadership.” Starting in August 2008, NCRA made a
significant effort to involve employee groups, build consensus among the union
and management, and educate its employees about the safety culture initiative.
NCRA was chosen for the research setting because the researcher has been
involved from the initial workshops and was the lead consultant on the project.
Additionally, the researcher has an excellent working relationship with Scott
Swanson, the internal safety culture change project manager.
NCRA has a dedicated guidance team and grassroots team structure for
implementing the safety culture change initiative. NCRA’s four grassroots teams
are made up of hourly employees along with one supervisor, whereas the
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guidance team is comprised of four union and six salaried employees.
Additionally, NCRA has provided training to employees who were not on one of
the dedicated teams and sought supervisor perceptions through training,
dialogues, focus groups, and surveys. Data were collected from employees on a
dedicated safety culture team, employees participating in the process but not on
a team, and employees who have not participated in the process.
NCRA, located in McPherson, Kansas, has 610 employees and is the
major employer and economic engine within this small, rural, agriculturalcentered community of roughly 15,000 people. Not only is safety a priority for the
company, but also for the nearby McPherson community located less than two
miles from the refinery grounds. Data were collected from many groups because
of a previous working relationship with Culture Change Consultants, Inc.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 is a literature review of major concepts within the field of
leadership alignment and safety culture, including current research on leadership
alignment, defining safety culture, a model of safety culture, characteristics of a
safety culture, a comparison of culture-based safety versus behavior-based
safety, and the current leadership alignment practices within safety management.
Chapter 3 includes the research methods designed to gather sufficient
data to address key components of effective leadership alignment within a safety
culture change process. Phase 1 of the research includes a paper survey
designed to identify alignment at both salaried and hourly levels. Phase 2 of the
research gathers qualitative data through interviews and focus groups for both
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salaried and hourly levels. Phase 3 identifies specific actions and structures
within the safety culture change process creating alignment.
Chapter 4 provides the results of the data gathered to investigate effective
leadership alignment at NCRA. Chapter 4 is comprised of a survey analysis and
interview analysis section. Finally, chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the
findings and draws conclusions. Chapter 5 also identifies the limitations of the
research and offers suggestions for further research in safety culture. From the
research and the data collected for NCRA, recommendations are suggested.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This study aimed to determine the key components of effective leadership
alignment interventions within the safety culture change process. The literature
review presented in this chapter includes current research on leadership
alignment and defining safety culture, including presenting a model of safety
culture, characteristics of a safety culture, and a comparison of culture-based
safety versus behavior-based safety. The current leadership alignment practices
within safety management are discussed. Leadership alignment, in combination
with organizational design and key actions among leaders, is necessary to create
agreement and direction within organizations. As a new field of safety
management, the emergence of a safety culture has generated many dimensions
and insights into the definition, characteristics, and practices of a safety culture,
while fueling a debate among scholars and practitioners. There is consensus that
a safety culture impacts an organization’s safety performance; however, there is
little agreement regarding implementation strategies such as those concerning
scope, sequence, and methods.
Leadership Alignment
Leadership alignment can be characterized as a double-loop learning
process (Argyris, 1979), where organizations clarify assumptions and
expectations. Leadership alignment processes move organizations to learn from
predictable patterns instead of learning from failure cases. Also, leadership
alignment can reveal an individual employee’s defensive behavior, thus, enabling
the leader to forecast possible areas of resistance during the implementation

11
stages of change processes. When organizations are proactive and work to
create leadership alignment, employees’ concerns are addressed, leaders’ past
behaviors are revealed, and the organization’s predictable response to change is
surfaced.
Addressing the emotions associated with leaders at all levels of the
organization, Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2002) did work on building
emotionally intelligent organizations and highlighted three essential components:
discovering the emotional reality, visualizing the ideal, and sustaining the
emotional intelligence. Counter to the efficiency culture of most organizations in
the United States, creating alignment within organizations requires the dedication
of time to involve employees in dialogue and gather their perspectives. The
amount of time spent creating this alignment is rarely seen as a value-added
activity. Additionally, it generally does not produce tangible results at the
accustomed speed of business.
It is uncertain how often organizations commit to such an intervention and
how they measure the return on investment of the intervention. Most
organizations look for leadership alignment around corporate strategy, vision,
and goals. While this work is essential for a high-performance organization, it is
often linear and rational, lacking the emotional aspect to create trust, respect,
and commitment (Goleman et al., 2002). Questions arise regarding how trust,
respect, and commitment can be created within organizations, while the progress
of organizations hinges on their ability to deal with change and align leaders
around strategic change efforts, rather than just around the mission, vision, and
goals.
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The principle of leadership alignment, both vertically and horizontally,
goes beyond just senior management and is more nuanced than previously
thought at the lower levels of management (Guth & Macmillan, 1986). O’Reilly,
Caldwell, and Chatman (2005) studied the effectiveness of implementing a
strategic initiative in a large health care system and examined the consistency of
leadership effectiveness across hierarchical levels. This case provides one
example of how to address the need for and effectiveness of leadership
alignment. Their results showed when there was leadership alignment, meaning
all levels of leadership were engaged in the strategic change efforts and there
was consistency of leadership at different levels within the organization, a
significant performance improvement followed. O’Reilly et al. concluded, “leaders
at various levels should be considered collectively to understand how leadership
influences strategic change” (p. 2). They further suggested that earlier
researchers “neglected to consider the extent to which leaders at intermediate
levels (e.g., department or division managers) were aligned in their support for
the new strategy” (p. 6). The research by O’Reilly et al. provided positive
evidence for aligning leaders across hierarchical levels to produce effective,
lasting strategic change by measuring overall patient satisfaction over a 2-year
period, suggesting that investing the organization’s time and capital in such
organizational development interventions produces many dividends.
Recently, Drath et al. (2008) proposed a new leadership framework and
new leadership ontology—direction, alignment, and commitment (DAC)—
focusing on these practical outcomes to determine if leadership is present within
organizations. What was intriguing was the addition of alignment to this definition
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of leadership. This new ontology transcended Bennis’ definition of leadership and
his tripod theory by suggesting, “the current, widely accepted leadership
ontology—leadership, followers, and shared goals—is becoming less useful for
understanding leadership in contexts that are increasingly peer-like and
collaborative” (p. 635). The new framework moved the leadership dialogue
forward by specifically focusing on new leadership beliefs and practices which
create direction, alignment, and commitment. The new framework proposed by
Drath et al. stated, “leadership is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for
achieving the longer term purposes and goals of a collective” (p. 636), and DAC
must be produced as a short-term criterion. It is the reproduction, development,
and re-creation of DAC that contributes to the long-term outcomes, often the
desired state at the onset of a strategic change effort.
The achievement of DAC within an organization allows for cooperation
and shared work to occur successfully. How DAC is produced is based on beliefs
and practices within the organization, encompassing some of the components of
Schein’s (2004) definition of organizational culture. Drath et al. (2008) argued it is
an individual’s beliefs, along with the collective beliefs about how to produce
DAC, that construct the social practices within an organization. Bringing attention
to these shared beliefs becomes the work of organization development
professionals working within today’s organizations.
By revealing the social practices and the beliefs within an organization, the
organization’s current state of DAC becomes useful data for implementing the
future state. The data gathered through leadership alignment may determine
areas of misalignment and raise questions such as: what messages are being
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interpreted by employees, who is considered an informal leader, and how are
committed employees implementing change? Leadership alignment interventions
may create a ‘tipping point’ within an organization to catalyze culture change,
suggesting that if employees perceive all levels of leaders working on alignment
around the change strategy, then support will follow to fulfill the long-term
organizational goals.
Given the current research on leadership theories and practices and,
specifically, the new leadership framework proposed by Drath et al. (2008), an
understanding of leadership alignment within the safety culture change process
would be useful to organizational leaders. According to Drath et al., culture
change is considered leadership if it works to achieve DAC as an outcome.
A small body of research connects the role of leadership to establishing a
positive safety culture. Thompson, Hilton, and Witt (1998) determined that
workers’ safe behavior is influenced not only by how managers communicate
about safety issues raised by workers but also by how fairly workers are treated
by supervisors. In their article “Target Zero: A Culture of Safety,” Burman and
Evans (2008) cited a case study of the Bristow Group, a civil aviation company
providing helicopter transportation to the oil and gas industry. Burman and Evans
distinguished the difference between safety management and safety leadership.
Recognizing the role of culture in the organization’s safety performance, Burman
and Evans emphasized the need to create a learning culture that connects all
level of the organization involved in safety. In the Bristow Group example, this
would mean aligning the pilots, maintenance crew, supervisors, and executive
management around the goal of zero accidents. Most closely related to
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leadership alignment within a safety culture change process is the research
Zohar and Luria (2003) conducted on supervisor-based safety.
Defining Safety Culture
In terms of safety management, much of the focus in the past 10 years
has been on safety culture. Several catastrophic accidents, including the
Chernobyl meltdown in the former Soviet Union and the United States’ Space
Shuttle Columbia explosion, introduced the idea of safety culture to an expansive
audience and garnered attention to the field of safety culture. As a term, safety
culture first appeared and was defined in the pioneer study by the International
Atomic Energy Agency Safety Culture: A report by the International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group (1991). The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group’s
1988 report explained how the events of the Chernobyl disaster were triggered
by a lack of knowledge and understanding of risk and safety by employees within
the organization (cited in International Atomic Energy Agency, 1991). According
to Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007), the report described safety culture as
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes,
as an overriding priority, that nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention
warranted by their significance. Choudhry et al. argued this report left the
definition of safety culture open to interpretation, suggested no way of assessing
safety culture, and believed the definition was not developed theoretically within
organizational culture. Furthermore, the report made no direct link between
safety culture and safety performance or safety leadership.
Since the seminal work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
1991, most safety professionals recognized safety culture as a valid concept;
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however, the debate regarding what safety culture was continued (Guldenmund,
2000). The debate gained heat when the causes, content, and consequences
were examined and continued without an accepted model within the safety field
(Choudhry et al., 2007; Guldenmund, 2000). In October 2003, after another
space shuttle explosion, the Columbia Accident Investigative Board, delivered
information emphasizing how the behavior of the organization and its leadership
doomed the shuttle. Citing a “broken safety culture,” the Board stated:
The investigation uncovered a troubling pattern in which Shuttle
Program management made erroneous assumptions about the
robustness of a system based on prior success rather than on
dependable engineering data and rigorous testing. The Shuttle
Program’s complex structure erected barriers to effective
communication and its safety culture no longer asks enough hard
questions about risk. Safety culture refers to an organization’s
characteristics and attitudes—promoted by its leaders and
internalized by its members—that serve to make safety the top
priority. (2003, pp. 184-185)
Despite the technical expertise of NASA employees, their assumptions
and perceptions regarding risk and safety, more simply, their complacency along
with ineffective communication, created a safety culture resulting in a disaster
and the loss of seven astronauts. The space shuttle accident illustrated a
paradigm shift in accident investigations where not only was the “what” question
asked to determine causation, but now the “why” question was asked as well. It
was within the “why” question that the socio-technical side of the organization
was examined. However, even with the current understanding of how safety
culture impacts safety management and leadership, there was no accepted
model of safety culture (Choudhry et al., 2007).
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Relevant to assessing safety culture, Schein (2004) believed studying
culture allowed members of organizations to know what to pay attention to and
how to make meaning of the world. Studying culture dealt with the feelings and
emotions experienced by individuals within the organization, creating a set of
operating assumptions. Schein’s defined organization culture as
. . . a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 17)
Working from this widely accepted definition of organizational culture, the
comparison of safety culture definitions and their evolution can be made. The
definition started with what was called a safety climate to the current distinction
between safety climate and safety culture. Zohar (1980) offered the first widely
used definition of safety climate in reference to what impacts individual worker
behavior: “a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their
work environments” (p. 96). Cox and Cox (1991) distinguished safety culture
from safety climate by proposing that safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs,
perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety, while Pidgeon
(1991) suggested safety culture was, “the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles,
and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the
exposure of employees, managers, customers, and members of the public to
conditions considered dangerous or injurious” (p. 134).
In 1996, Lee proposed a comprehensive definition suggesting, “the safety
culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes,
perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the
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commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, and organisation's health and
safety management” (p. 2). The definition of safety climate progressed further
when Cox and Flin (1998) raised the question of whether safety climate was
synonymous with safety culture, presuming most safety professionals could not
make the distinction. Moving closer to a recognized definition, Guldenmund
(2000) clarified safety climate as, “attitudes towards safety within an
organization” (p. 215) and safety culture as, “the strong convictions or dogmas
underlying the safety attitudes” (p. 215). Guldenmund’s view was that
organizational culture, not safety culture, should be the central theme within
organizations looking to improve safety performance. A few years later,
Guldenmund (2007) cited the limitations of measuring a safety culture through
questionnaires that identified the attitudes shared throughout the whole
company. Given this measurement limitation, he believed safety climate
(attitudes) and safety culture were indistinguishable and represented different
approaches to determine the priority of safety within an organization.
Taking a comprehensive approach from 1998 onward and recognizing the
surge of interest in the safety culture field in all industries, Choudhry et al. (2007)
reiterated the lack of accepted definitions for safety climate, safety culture, and
safety management, suggesting the terms were used interchangeably and that
safety climate was a byproduct of safety culture. Careful to frame their definition
within the construction industry, Choudhry et al. (2007) proposed safety culture to
be
the product of individual and group behaviors, attitudes, norms and
values, perceptions and thoughts that determine the commitment
to, and style and proficiency of, an organization’s system and how
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its personnel act and react in terms of the company’s ongoing
safety performance. (p. 1008)
A Safety Culture Model
The lack of an accepted definition stemmed from the dynamic nature of
safety culture or, more broadly, organization culture, which was seen as open
systems within organizations that must confront internal and external pressures.
It was widely accepted that safety climate, a dimension of the overall safety
culture, was a necessary component of safety management because numerous
structural models had shown it was possible to predict unsafe behavior or
accidents (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000; Cheyne, Tomas, Cox, & Oliver, 1999;
Thompson et al., 1998) and non-linear models (Guastello, 1989; Guastello,
Gershon, & Murphy, 1999). However, as the field progressed, it was defining the
dimensions of a safety culture that created the most divide among scholars.
In 1994, Geller proposed a model with three factors—person, behavior,
and environment—and 10 principles that provide the foundation for a Total
Safety Culture. The model advocated for the process to be led by the workforce
and built around empowered, resourced teams. Geller did not address how the
safety culture was connected to the overall organization culture and was based
mostly around the individuals and behaviors, reflecting an approach influenced
by the behavior-based safety model. This model did shift the thinking from safety
being a value to safety being a priority.
Unlike Geller’s (1994) model, Cooper (2000) argued that people, jobs, and
environment as well as psychological, behavioral, and situational factors
influenced safety culture. He based his safety culture model on Social Cognitive
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Theory. More specifically, Cooper’s model worked from the understanding that
the interactive and reciprocal relationship between the psychological, behavioral,
and situational factors not only influenced accident causation models, but also
led to broader change initiatives like Total Quality Management. While Geller’s
model did not show a connection to the larger organizational culture, Cooper
recognized safety culture as a sub-facet of organizational culture, yet did not
address the assumptions related to safety within the organization. Cooper’s
(2000) model did address the issue of creating a safety culture product,
suggesting safety culture initiatives should be goal-directed with many sub-goals
to evaluate the effectiveness of the work—ultimately reducing injuries and
accidents and saving lives. According to Cooper’s model, employee’s attitudes
and perceptions could be assessed by measuring the safety climate through
questionnaires, checklists, and audits or inspections.
Implementing a safety culture model required assessing the current safety
culture of an organization. Several approaches existed. Recognizing the
evolution in safety management approaches and safety culture assessments,
Kennedy and Kirwan (1998) proposed the Safety Culture Hazard and Operability
approach to identify the vulnerabilities within the safety management processes
and the safety culture factors influencing these vulnerabilities. The approach
used an accepted methodological framework and analytical process, although it
was thought to be very resource-intensive. Cox and Cheyne (2000) provided
another assessment of safety culture published as the “Safety Climate
Assessment Toolkit.” This toolkit used questionnaires, focus groups, behavioral
observations, and situational audits to determine the effectiveness of safety
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management systems. Cox and Cheyne envisioned this data being used to
stimulate discussion and that the tools would adapt to fit the organization,
providing a foundation for organizations to learn more about themselves.
Glendon and Stanton (2000) argued the advancement of safety culture
assessments through a triangulated methodology was needed. This would
include safety culture questionnaires, quasi-ethnographic studies, and
benchmarking of other companies within a culture where safety was measured
regularly, needed follow up was completed, and learning was shared with others.
Characteristics of a Safety Culture
Despite the lack of clarity in a model and the dispute over the dimensions
of a safety culture, Choudhry et al. (2007) defined or framed the characteristics of
an organization’s safety culture to be
. . . one in which safety is regarded by everyone as being an issue
that concerns everyone. As a result, safety rules should be
understood and adhered to; all incidents must be reported and
investigated quickly for actions to be taken, and for increased
learning. (p. 1003)
What Choudhry et al. (2007) implied was a set of characteristics defining a
positive safety culture that in theory could be used to assess safety culture.
Several studies existed outlining the positive attributes or characteristics of
a safety culture. Much work had been done to attribute the impact of safety
culture to major accidents like Chernobyl and the Challenger, but now there was
emphasis on attributing an organization’s safety culture to individual accidents on
a much smaller scale. By examining what the safety climate surveys measured, it
was possible to ascertain the accepted characteristics of a positive safety culture
(Flin, Mearns, O’Conner, & Bryden, 2000), including management commitment,
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supervisor competence, prioritizing safety over production (Hale, 2000), and time
pressure. Compiling 10 studies on 20 companies, Shannon, Mayr, and Haines
(1997) compared the variables identified with lower injury rates and determined
three common characteristics: empowerment of the workforce (Choudhry et al.,
2007; Hale, 2000), delegation of safety activities to employees, and top
management’s participation in health and safety. Conversely, using the same
comparisons, the use of discipline and the threat to take issues outside the
health and safety committee correlated to increased injury rates.
Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin (2003), citing work at off shore environments,
concluded communication around safety issues such as accident and near miss
investigations, safety audits, or changes to procedures could be correlated to
reducing risks. Contrary to the belief that management support (Shannon et al.,
1997) correlated to a decrease in accidents and injuries, Mearns et al. (2003)
found the opposite to be true, presuming that management support was high,
because of lower safety performance in preceding years. Furthermore, there was
limited evidence that management visibility on site discussing safety, often seen
as management support, improved overall safety performance. However, in this
research, management commitment was cited as one of the crucial elements to a
positive safety culture but was not analyzed against accidents and injuries.
Taylor and Taylor (2008) characterized a positive safety culture as one
where there was a reporting culture, a just culture, and a learning culture where
the first requirement was trust (Choudhry et al. 2007; Hale, 2000; Vecchio-Sudus
& Griffiths, 2004), which outlined acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
Vecchio-Sudus and Griffiths argued there needed to be: management
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commitment demonstrated when resources are provided; employee involvement,
ownership, and commitment; recognized changes in safety attitudes and
behaviors; diverse training on a breadth of safety topics; special campaigns to
highlight safety initiatives; and promotional strategies to enhance safety
awareness. These positive characteristics were promoted when the organization
engaged in proactive, divergent, and judicial thinking.
Summarizing the debate on the characteristics of a positive safety culture
in their article, “The Nature of Safety Culture: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art,”
Choudry et al. (2007) took the position a positive safety culture was one where
there are five components:
[1] management commitment to safety; [2] management concerns
for the workforce; [3] mutual trust and credibility between
management and employees; [4] workforce empowerment; [5] and
lastly continuous monitoring, corrective action, review of system
and continual improvements to reflect the safety at the work site.
(p. 1005)
The characteristics of a positive safety culture allowed for the definition,
methodology, and dimensions to merge into actionable items for an organization.
The Safety Culture Approach Versus Behavior-Based Safety Approach
Defining the debate between behavior-based safety performance
management and safety culture performance management, Cooper (2000) found
very little research in this area has examined the moderating or
mediating effects of job-related factors (e.g., team-working, size of
workgroups, task-complexity, goal-conflicts, task strategies, etc.),
person factors (goal-commitment, self-efficacy, self-regulation,
hierarchical level, social status, etc.), and organizational factors
(e.g., communications, management's commitment, resource
availability, etc.) on actual safety behaviour and on the
development of safety culture per se. Similarly, no work has been
undertaken on the reciprocal relationships between these variables.
(p. 129)
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Dejoy (2005) argued the two approaches (behavior change and culture
change) were complementary and the strengths of both should be used to
manage safety performance. Behavior-based safety focused safety management
on individual safety observations and positive feedback with subsequent
behavior modifications if necessary to reduce injuries and accidents, while
culture-based safety looked at the influences of culture, specifically beliefs,
attitudes, and assumptions, on safety behaviors and safety programs. The
argument for behavior-based safety was that it was easier to observe behaviors
and produce analytical data, while looking at culture was intuitive and lacking an
agreed-upon methodology or model. At a deeper level, behavior-based safety
focused on immediate causes, while culture based safety focused on basic
causes and took a broader perspective including the environment when
addressing safety performance. Culture-based safety creates shared leadership
among employees and management to implement organizational change.
The two safety management approaches collided when behavior-based
safety management proponents argued the approach was difficult to manage
when the organizational culture was non-supportive or dysfunctional (Krause,
1997), yet, it was believed that employee participation in behavioral observations
with positive feedback created a positive affect for safety that could lead to
culture change (Saari, 1992). This assumed culture change was indirect, and
behavior based safety only worked in supportive, functional, trusting
environments. Cox, Jones, and Rycraft (2004) recognized trust as an essential
component to behavior-based programs. Culture change proponents recognized
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trust as a requirement for safety culture change and directly addressed issues of
mistrust as a basic cause for accidents and injuries.
Implementation of these two safety management approaches differ. Dejoy
(2005) characterized behavior-based safety approaches as bottom-up and
culture change safety approaches as top-down (Glendon & Stanton 2000), while
Simon and Frazee (2005) and Simon and Cistaro (2009) suggested a grassrootsled, management supported safety culture change process. The concept is that
grassroots teams working on culture change could not succeed without
management support, and leaders at all levels have to be enlisted and educated.
Simon and Frazee (2005) provided safety culture change methodologies
and use the example of the dramatically improved safety performance at General
Motors North American manufacturing facilities in their article, “Building a Better
Safety Vehicle: Leadership-Driven Culture Change at General Motors.” This
seminal work argued that safety culture change efforts could be both top-down
and bottom-up in approach, challenging the conventional thinking that safety
culture change was a top-down safety management approach. The President’s
Council mandated that the manufacturing managers’ council take on the safety
culture initiative and address the dismal safety performance results.
Each year, nearly one of three GM workers was being injured
seriously enough to require medical treatment. Nearly five percent
of the workforce was being injured seriously enough to miss at least
one day of work. GM was averaging about four occupational
fatalities per year. Workers’ compensation costs exceeded $100
million annually. (p. 36)
While the effort acknowledged and worked within the GM top-down
culture, union and management leaders worked together to improve safety.
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Ultimately, the strategy implemented cascaded down the safety culture change
efforts from plant leadership to supervisory levels and union committee
representatives to the shop floor employees. The manufacturing managers’
council removed their involvement and turned the process over to plant
leadership. After a decade long effort, GM had made safety a corporate priority.
To create a new safety culture at Public Service Electric & Gas, one where
there was sustainability and longevity, the organization believed they needed a
top-down and bottom-up approach to advance its safety culture. Public Service
Electric & Gas initiated three leadership initiatives. One initiative created
grassroots safety champions through mentoring and coaching and used a
bottom-up approach. Another initiative developed middle managers’
understanding of safety culture and their new role in support of employee-led
safety. To build internal capacity, an initiative to provide the training for crew
leaders to use culture-based tools to solve safety issues and concerns was
formed (Simon & Cistaro, 2009).
Medina, McSween, Rost, and Alvero (2009), in their article, “Behavioral
Safety in a Refinery: Large-Scale Change and Long-Term Results,” provided
results of a behavior-based safety initiative at a refinery and correlated the
increase in safety observations with the decrease in safety incidents. The
behavior-based safety approach implemented at this refinery focused on an
employee-led implementation where employees trained one another, conducted
safety observations, and published results and actions. The article concluded the
behavior-based safety program “has become part of the culture” at the Citgo
refinery (Medina et al., 2009, p. 39), indirectly making the argument that a
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behavior-based safety program is part of an organization’s safety culture. Dejoy
(2005) made the argument the research for the two approaches lacked sufficient
research of randomized, controlled evaluations to provide a recommendation of
one approach over the other.
Current Practices of Leadership Alignment within Safety Management
Frequently, organizations are broken into three groups: management,
supervision, and front-line employees. While these three groups have vastly
different responsibilities, how they relate to safety within the organization, based
on their perceptions and assumptions of safety, impact the overall safety culture
within an organization. It was recognized that there needed to be leadership at all
levels of the organization as it related to safety culture. Hofmann and Morgeson
(1999) were the first to study the effect of leadership on safety records,
demonstrating the quality of the relationships between group leaders and their
superiors. The relationship was measured through the leader-member exchange
level and showed the impact to worker and group safety performance.
Specifically, the leader’s safety communication and the leader’s declared
commitment to safety made a positive impact on safety performance for the
worker group, suggesting a high leader-member exchange level reflected a
leader’s concern for the safety of workers. There was reciprocity in the supervisor
worker relationship when the leader-member exchange level was high, promoting
trust, openness, and loyalty while encouraging leaders to avoid short-term
production pressures at the cost of safety (Pate-Cornell, 1990) and encouraging
open communication (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). Ironically, and all too true
given the space shuttle Columbia’s disaster, after the insights in 1990, Pate-
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Cornell co-authored an article on the risk analysis for the tiles of the space
shuttle, noting this thermal protection system was one of the shuttle’s critical
subsystems and was vulnerable to debris hits (Pate-Cornell & Fischbeck, 1993).
Zohar (2000) showed an empirical link between the safety climate
perceptions related to supervisory safety practices and worker injuries, as
measured by microaccidents (minor injuries requiring medical attention). Cooper
and Phillip (2004) showed similar data were limited safety climate perceptions
were addressed and suggested that in general, “Changes in climate perceptions
do not necessarily show changes in behavioral safety performance. Equally,
changes in behavioral safety performance are not necessarily reflected in
changes in climate perceptions” (p. 510). This statement insinuated the nuanced
effect of perceptions and individual behavior recognizing the relationship’s impact
on an organization’s safety culture.
Zohar (2002b) suggested that transformational and transactional
leadership, when augmented, influence safety behavior on group members.
Specifically, transactional leadership influenced safety through effective
monitoring, reliability, and predictability, whereas transformational leadership
influenced safety by providing motivation and concern for others. Recognizing
the important role of leadership in safety performance, Zohar (2002a) designed a
leadership intervention model for supervisors. This model focused on increasing
worker interviews to monitor and reward safety performance while providing
weekly feedback on the supervisor-worker interactions. These safety-orientation
interactions by supervisors, emphasizing the priority of safety over production,
showed a significant decrease in minor injury rates, increased ear plug use, and
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an increase in safety climate scores. Further developing this intervention, Zohar
and Luria (2003) suggested adding these safety-orientation interactions between
line-supervisors and managers higher up the organizational hierarchy along with
data on employee safety behavior and the relationship of increased supervisor
interactions with worker safety. The leadership intervention took a behavioralbased safety approach by measuring the frequency of supervisor safety
orientations similar to measuring worker safety observations. Additionally, Zohar
and Luria’s research involved supervisor quality interactions along with safety
interactions showing an increase in quality and production, suggesting an
effective supervisor must be able to manage both priorities simultaneously.
Recognizing the role of leadership in keeping workers safe, supervisorbased safety was pioneered by Zohar and Luria (2003). Building on the
supervisor relationship, the researchers demonstrated supervisor priorities must
align with the strategic priorities of an organization in order to successfully
implement safety policies and procedures (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Adding a
technical improvement to the supervisor-based safety intervention by placing
supervisors physically closer to workers and increasing supervisor visibility
increased safety-orientation interactions and increased safety performance
(Luria, Zohar, & Erev, 2008).
Beyond recording the supervisor safety related exchanges, an intervention
team in the research study by Luria et al. (2008) provided feedback and coaching
to first and second line supervisors to improve alignment. Senior management
was involved in the same process of feedback and coaching around supervisorbased safety to create alignment across the hierarchy in the organization.
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Through biweekly feedback and coaching sessions by the intervention team,
essentially modeling the leadership behaviors to implement a system-wide
process, the supervisor-based safety process was gradually transferred to the
organization’s leadership. The alignment process increased the frequency of
safety-related interactions at all levels and showed decreased injury rates. The
study recognized that, “ongoing exchanges between leaders and members exert
a significant effect on leadership as leverage for improving safety” (p. 278).
Hale (2000) suggested it was necessary to aggregate the data by work
groups to explain the safety culture at each work group. If the data were
explained at each work group, then it would be implausible to get an organization
to adopt one safety culture. This suggests the safety culture may not need to be
the same for each organizational level. By conducting a safety culture survey of
construction workers in Hong Kong, Fung, Tam, Tung, and Man (2005) provided
data showing the safety culture divergences between three groups of workers:
top management, supervisory staff, and front-line workers. In the study, Fung et
al. found significant differences between management and worker groups related
to five areas of safety culture: organizational commitment and communication,
reporting of accidents and near misses, line management commitment, personal
role, and workmates’ influence. There was less difference between supervisor
and worker groups with just two areas showing significant differences:
organizational commitment and communication and reporting of accidents and
incidents. Also, there was no significant difference in responses between
management and supervisor groups.
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Fung et al. (2005) hypothesized the differences arose from the diversity in
educational background and sense of responsibility. As solutions to the
divergence, Fung et al. advocated for promoting safety awareness through
campaigns, and “a proper and open communication channel has to be
established among the three groups which can help different levels of staff giving
their voices on safety issues in order to narrow down the safety culture
divergences among them” (p. 510). While promoting the need for alignment
around safety culture, Fung et al. neglected to suggest a method.
More research is needed related to leadership practices within safety.
Specifically, Dejoy (2005) identified that few research studies have attempted “to
create taxonomies of critical supervisory and management behaviors specific to
safety” (p. 121). Identifying these behaviors for management and supervisors
would impact the overall safety performance within organizations. By assessing
the alignment created within a safety culture change process, these behaviors
might be identified.
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Chapter 3
Research Methods
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process.
Specifically, it examined leadership alignment within the implementation of safety
culture change process at the NCRA in McPherson, Kansas. The safety culture
change process was led by Culture Change Consultants, Inc. and was one of
NCRA’s strategic priorities in order to be recognized as an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration voluntary protection programs star site for safety
performance. Researching the implementation efforts of NCRA’s safety culture
change process provided data into leadership alignment interventions moving
beyond the assumed role of leadership. This study was conducted in accordance
with all requirements put forth by the Institutional Review Board for research on
human subjects.
Data were collected starting in December 2009 using surveys, interviews,
and focus groups. There was a need to collect both quantitative and qualitative
data from employees and stakeholders to identify the structures, messages, and
training resulting in leadership alignment around the safety culture change
process. While a survey may have determined whether or not there was
alignment or misalignment around the safety culture change process, focus
groups and interviews were conducted to identify the key actions and messages
from leaders. While leaders are formally identified by title, there are informal
leaders who may create alignment or misalignment around the safety culture
change process.
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Phase 1: Group Survey
Grassroots team members, guidance team members, supervisors, and
hourly refinery employees received a paper survey (See Appendix A)
accompanied by a consent letter from the investigator explaining the purpose of
the research study (See Appendix B) This quantified the perceived levels of
alignment or misalignment within each stakeholder group impacted by the safety
culture change process. Furthermore, related to the safety culture change
process, the survey addressed levels of commitment, team communication,
management communication, and perceived priorities within the management
and hourly employee groups.
At the refinery, 129 employees completed the paper survey—24 salaried
and 105 hourly. All responses were confidential. Participation was voluntary and
anyone could drop out of the study at anytime without risk.
Phase 2: Focus Groups and Interviews
Following the survey, once the data were analyzed, focus groups and
interviews were convened with employee groups to present the data collected.
The interviews were intended to identify specific group perspectives. Salaried
and hourly employees were separated to keep the comments from affecting
employee-supervisory relationships. The interviews were semi-structured around
the paper survey questions. The interviews generally lasted 1 hour and were indepth in order to know and understand employee experiences.
In total, 16 interviews were conducted to address perceptions, meanings,
and assumptions of the safety culture change process at NCRA. In total, 25
employees were interviewed, including nine salaried and 16 hourly employees.
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Of the interviewees, three employees were guidance team members and eight
employees were grassroots team members.
Before beginning the focus groups with hourly employees, participants
were asked to keep all comments confidential. As an added measure of
protection, individual interviews were offered to anyone who wished to share their
views in private. The interviewer had established rapport and trust with the
respondents through previous interactions on safety culture grassroots teams
and the guidance team. The interview data were recorded using a note-taking
method. The responses were anonymous and identified by salaried or hourly as
well as by team member and non-team member status. Additionally, focus group
comments from hourly employees were associated only with participants’ job
classification as operations, maintenance, or safety. For salary and supervision
employees, only survey and private interviews were conducted to ensure
confidentiality. Focus group and interview participants were pulled from subjects
completing the survey on a voluntary basis. Emphasis was placed on identifying
personal actions, group projects, and safety messages that created alignment or
misalignment within the safety culture change process.
Phase 3: Data Analysis
From the research methods in Phase 1 and 2, the data were analyzed to
determine what key components of effective leadership within the safety culture
change process created alignment or misalignment. To determine the degree of
leadership alignment for this initiative, a paper survey was administered to
salaried and hourly employees. Their positive responses on the paper survey
determined alignment within the safety culture change process. To identify what
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actions contributed to creating leadership alignment and surface the necessary
actions to move towards stronger leadership alignment, interviews also were
conducted with employee groups. Specifically, leaders’ actions, communication
about the safety culture change process, the organization development
interventions, and the team structures were identified and prioritized according to
the interview data.
Survey Analysis
Survey data were compiled and analyzed using Stata software and the
following modeling process: (a) cleaning the data, (b) conducting a quick factor
analysis, (c) compositing the data according to factor analysis and intuition, (d)
selecting the most internally consistent composites, (e) justifying the reasons for
choices to avoid Type 1 error by running too many tests, (f) analyzing whether
Q1 through Q4 predict C4 or C6, (g) explaining why Q2 was bifurcated and why
Q4 was ignored, and (h) parsing out variables of interest for tabular graphics.
The objective of the analysis was to identify relationships between workrelated demographic indicators and workplace attitudes. Given the large number
of items on the survey and the even greater number of possible permutations of
data inquiries, it was necessary to avoid blindly building models that would yield
statistically significant findings merely as a product of random chance. To limit
Type 1 error, clear-cut hypotheses were developed before running a series of
regression analyses.
The qualitative research that guided the survey design suggested that four
work-related demographic indicators were associated with differences in
workplace attitudes. It was hypothesized that:
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1. Hourly versus salaried employees experienced the workplace
differently.
2. Grassroots and guidance team members were more likely to
understand workplace roles and responsibilities than their non-team member
peers.
3. More tenured employees would be less cooperative than their neophyte
colleagues.
4. Affiliation with a particular employee division (safety, operations,
maintenance) impacted attitude towards the safety culture change process.
Unfortunately, because there was no perfect linear relationship between
the categorical classifications of the demographic factors of interest, the
challenge was to draft intelligent hypotheses that did not require a multiplicity of
indicator variables and accompanying statistical tests, thereby, increasing the
researcher’s likelihood of committing Type 1 error. For the fourth demographic
factor (employee division), the data were not dichotomized into the three
response categories. Instead, the first three demographic factors were selected
to provide the basis of the analysis. Given the understanding of workplace
dynamics in this refinery, it was believed that demographic factors 1-3 would
better serve the inquiry. For demographic factor 2, again seeking to decrease
Type 1 error, the response categories were bifurcated into two groupings of
"team membership" and "no team membership".
To continue the analysis, it was necessary to determine a set of
underlying latent constructs, each of which represented a particular area of workrelated perceptions. There was a need to better understand how employee
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position and ranking was associated with sentiments about workplace
circumstances. The survey was built with several separate constructs in mind.
After an initial factor analysis, the data showed that some items did not group
together as expected and were investigated further by determining the
Cronbach's Alpha value for the clusters of items believed to belong within each
individual construct (See Tables 1 and 2). A pair of orthogonal constructs,
addressing "alignment" and "role of teams," demonstrated high overall Alpha
values (0.80 and 0.78, respectively). Alignment is referred to as Composite 1 and
“role of teams” as Composite 2.
After obtaining two internally consistent constructs, it was possible to
create a parsimonious model to determine the demographic factors that were
most predictive of scores on these two composite indices. Two final models were
built using stepwise regression, performing separate tests of independent
variables before expanding the model.
Table 1
Standardized, Inter-Item Correlations for Composite 1 (Alignment)

N = 129
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Table 2
Standardized, Inter-Item Correlations for Composite 2 (Role of Teams)

N = 129
The first model in the final analysis revealed a statistically significant
relationship between the "alignment" composite and demographic factor 1 (hourly
versus salaried). The coefficient on the predictor variable (0.553) described the
positive association between "alignment" score and salaried employees. In
context, it showed, on average, salaried employees scored 0.553 points higher
on the "alignment" index than hourly employees (See Table 3). The t-value of
4.41 and the corresponding p-value of < 0.0001 suggested a robust finding
unlikely to be the result of random chance.
Table 3
Ordinary Least-Squares Regression, Composite 4 (Alignment) on Question 1
(Hourly/Salaried)

N = 129
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The second model in the final analysis found an intuitive result, showing
strong association of "role of teams" to both demographic factors 1 and 2 (team
membership). The respective coefficients of the two predictors (0.699 and
-0.491) explained that (a) salaried employees, on average, scored 0.699 points
higher on the "role of teams" index and that (b) team members scored 0.491
points higher on the "role of teams" index than their non-team member peers
(See Table 4). The statistical analysis verified a logical assumption: Team
members better understood the role of teams within the safety culture change
process and could express that sentiment. The t-value of 5.18 and the
corresponding p-value of <0.0001 suggested a robust finding unlikely to be the
result of random chance.
Table 4
Ordinary Least-Squares Regression, Composite 6 (Role of Teams) on Question
2 (Teams/Non-Team) and Question 1 (Hourly/Salaried)

N = 128
Focus Group and Interview Analysis
In analyzing the data, salaried and hourly employee comments were
separated and the non-team member and team member descriptors were

40
deleted for anonymity. Low-inference descriptive codes were used to make
sense of the initial responses. An open-coding approach was used to make
comparisons and to generate further questions. The codes used were: salaried
employees’ actions around safety, hourly employees’ actions around safety,
guidance team and grassroots team structure, grassroots team projects,
guidance team projects, the changes in safety since the safety culture change
process began, and communication about safety.
The open-coding approach led to more specific targets. Based on the
quantitative data, leaders’ actions, team membership experiences, and how
hourly and salaried employees viewed the company’s commitment to the safety
culture change process were targeted in the coding. Higher-inference pattern
codes were used to bring together the descriptive codes, or indicators, into
themes.
In total, five themes were created: (a) both salaried and hourly employees’
actions showed commitment to the safety culture change process, (b) guidance
team and grassroots team structures created alignment within the safety culture
change process, (c) grassroots team and guidance team projects impacted the
direction of the safety culture change process, (d) the overall perceptions of
safety changed as a result of the safety culture change process, and (e)
communication of safety and the safety culture change process mattered to
employees (see summary of themes chart). While coding, memoing was used to
theorize about the data reviewed. At the same time, conclusions were drawn
regarding the data by integrating the qualitative data with the quantitative data.
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Lastly, the research data was gathered from January 2010 through
February 2010. At the beginning of 2010, there was an increase in incidents and
injuries and a contractor fatality, the first in NCRA’s 65-year history. These
events may have influenced both the quantitative and qualitative responses from
employees. Following the research study, a brief overview of the results was
provided to NCRA employees. When requested, the full research study was
shared electronically with employees.
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Chapter 4
Findings
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process.
Specifically, it examined leadership alignment within the implementation of safety
culture change process at the NCRA in McPherson, Kansas. The safety culture
change process was led by Culture Change Consultants, Inc. and was one of
NCRA’s strategic priorities in order to be recognized as an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration voluntary protection programs star site for safety
performance. Researching the implementation efforts of NCRA’s safety culture
change process provided data into leadership alignment interventions moving
beyond the assumed role of leadership. Chapter 4 presents the five key research
findings of leadership alignment within a safety culture change process at NCRA.
Key findings for this study are as follows:
1. Both salaried and hourly employees’ actions showed commitment to the
safety culture change process. The qualitative data suggested salaried
employees were more aware of actions that demonstrated commitment to the
safety culture change process. Both hourly and salaried employees regarded
allocating time and spending funds on the safety culture change process and
taking the time to listen as showing commitment. While salaried employees
identified specific behaviors of salaried leadership that demonstrated
commitment to safety, such as visibility in the refinery, honest dialogue,
apologizing, and following safety policies and procedures, hourly employees did
not mention these behaviors. Salaried employees routinely spoke of how hourly
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employees showed a high level of commitment to the safety culture change
process by participating during unpaid time. Hourly employees did not refer to
unpaid time. That said, the quantitative data from salaried employees on the
survey were more positive than hourly employee data. Both the qualitative and
quantitative data suggested the horizontal alignment between salaried
employees was stronger than the horizontal alignment of hourly employees
within the safety culture change process. Additionally, the data suggested the
vertical alignment between salaried employees and hourly employees within the
safety culture change process was disconnected.
2. Guidance team and grassroots team structure created alignment within
the safety culture change process. The qualitative data showed the guidance
team and grassroots team structure created alignment within the safety culture
change process. The guidance team and grassroots teams were made up of
both salaried and union employees with the grassroots teams being coached by
a member of the guidance team. Both salaried and hourly employees believed
the heterogeneity of employee levels on the guidance team and grassroots
teams mattered. The team structure without a hierarchy and with each member
having one vote allowed both employee groups to believe hourly employees had
ownership within the safety culture change process. This alignment of employees
participating on teams was reinforced by the quantitative data showing higher
responses by employees on safety culture change teams. Even though there
were more hourly employees participating on safety culture change teams, hourly
employees responded with lower scores. These data suggested hourly
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employees were unaware of the level of hourly employee ownership in the safety
culture change process.
3. Grassroots team and guidance team projects impacted the direction of
the safety culture change process. According to the qualitative data, the
grassroots team and guidance team projects impacted the direction of the safety
culture change process. The projects were visible and reinforced the attention
given to improve the safety culture at NCRA. Hourly employees believed the
grassroots team projects demonstrated how hourly and salaried employees
worked in partnership, and non-team members were asked for input on the
projects.
The guidance team project that created a new safety incentive program
built on choice, ownership, and participation was seen as improving safety at the
refinery. Hourly and salaried employees believed the safety incentive program
gave employees ownership of their personal safety. Additionally, salaried
employees cited an increase in safety reporting and an increase in safety
communication at the 8:00 am meetings. Hourly employees believed the new
incentive program increased the number of safety meetings from one to five on a
voluntary basis. While the comments were positive regarding the new safety
incentive program, few employees recognized the program as a safety culture
guidance team project. This may have influenced the lower responses of hourly
employees on the survey.
4. The overall perceptions of safety changed as a result of the safety
culture change process. Employees’ actions showing commitment, the guidance
team and grassroots team structure, and the safety culture change projects
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emerged as themes from the qualitative data that influenced perceptions of
safety at NCRA. Data suggested both hourly and salaried employees believed
the safety culture change process influenced the decision to have both employee
groups participate in root cause accident investigations. Because of the open and
candid dialogue between hourly and salaried employees on guidance and
grassroots teams, many employees felt they could now speak openly and
honestly about safety. As a result of the safety culture change process, salaried
employees believed the company was taking time to operate safely, and hourly
employees felt they would stop a fellow employee working unsafely regardless of
repercussions.
5. Communication of safety and the safety culture change process
mattered to employees. According to the qualitative data, the way in which safety
and the safety culture change process was communicated presented another
theme. Salaried employees believed the company was headed in the right
direction and there was alignment within the company for the safety culture
change process. Salaried employees recognized how their actions and how they
communicated influenced the safety perceptions of hourly employees. Both
groups believed fellow employees were more serious about safety since starting
the safety culture change process, as shown by the increased communication
about safety procedures, reporting, and concerns. Increased communication was
attributed to the open dialogue between hourly and salaried employees (see
Table 5).
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Table 5
Summary of Themes from Qualitative Data
Themes
1. Employees’
actions showed
commitment to the
safety culture
change process.

Hourly Employee
Responses
• Given time to attend
safety culture
change meetings
and providing
monetary resources
for safety culture
change process.
• Leaders taking the
time to listen first to
concerns rather than
to just react.
• Employees assume
leaders are
insincere when
talking about safety.

2. Guidance team
• Hourly and salaried
and grassroots team
employees
structure created
participate on the
alignment within the
same teams.
safety culture
• Have shared
change process.
ownership of the
process.

3. Grassroots team
and guidance team
projects impacted
the direction of the
safety culture
change process.

• Working with
salaried employees
to complete
projects.
• Grassroots teams
are presenting
projects at safety
meetings and asking
for input on the
projects from peers.

Salary Employee Responses
• Give time to attend safety culture
change meetings and provide
monetary resources for safety
culture change process.
• Leaders take the time to listen first to
concerns and not just react, engage
in honest and candid dialogue, and
apologize for making mistakes
during the leadership alignment
dialogues.
• Leaders follow safety policies and
procedures, be visible (on site)
within the refinery or plant, provide
detailed and specific safety
information at every meeting,
respond to safety concerns in a
timely manner, and remind people if
safety policies and procedures are
not followed.
• Joint decision making and open
communication—one vote, one
person--and employees from all
levels.
• Hourly employees work directly with
upper management, have shared
ownership of the safety culture
change process, and leadership
opportunities are created.
• Unsure about how to support the
process if they are not on a team.
• The increased signage project is
making a difference.
• The grassroots team projects make
the safety culture change process
more visible and reinforce the
message of safety culture change.

47
Table 5 (Continued)
Themes

Hourly Employee Responses

Salary Employee Responses

4. The overall
perceptions of
safety changed as
a result of the
safety culture
change process.

• Joint participation with
salaried employees in root
cause accident
investigations.
• Open dialogue about
safety between hourly and
salaried employees.
• Willing to say to one
another “This is how we do
it safely,” regardless of
repercussions.
• Feel the selection process
for guidance team and
grassroots team members
is unclear.
• Feel they are not receiving
communication about the
guidance team and there is
no constant update about
the safety culture change
process in a uniformed
format.

• All employees can speak
openly about safety now.
• Upper management is
participating in root cause
accident investigations.
• Company is taking the time to
operate safely.

5. Communication
of safety and the
safety culture
change process
mattered to
employees.

• Communication at all levels
about the safety culture change
process, but needs to get
better.
• Communication from the
grassroots teams at monthly
supervisor meetings and
communication from the safety
department about the guidance
team and grassroots teams is
effective.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process.
Specifically, it looked at leadership alignment within the implementation of safety
culture change process at the NCRA in McPherson, Kansas. Researching the
implementation efforts of NCRA’s safety culture change process provided data
regarding leaders’ actions, employee perceptions, and leadership alignment
interventions. This chapter presents conclusions, recommendations to managers,
recommendations to organization development professionals, limitations of the
research, and suggestions for further research.
1. The safety culture change process at NCRA was successful. The
NCRA safety culture assessment was completed in September 2008, and the
findings were reported back in November 2008. The safety culture change
process at NCRA began when the guidance team, comprised of hourly and
salaried employees, was formed in January 2009 and tasked with feeding back
the safety culture report to all employees. In April 2009, four safety culture
grassroots teams formed to work on projects generated from the issues identified
in the safety culture survey report and during the survey feedback session.
In 2007 and 2008, the recordable accidents and injury rate at NCRA was
3.2 and 3.1. In 2009, the accident and injury rate was 2.0 (See Table 6). Also, in
2008, the lost time cases rate and lost work days went from 1.4 and 18.8,
respectively, to 0.0 and 0.0 in 2009. All three indicators presented a down trend
in rates and an increase in safety performance for 2009 (See Figure 1). During
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the interviews, both hourly and salaried employees believed the improved safety
performance was a result of the safety culture change process.
Table 6
National Cooperative Refinery Association Total Lost Time, Restricted Day, and
Lost Work Days Versus National Petroleum Refining Association Total Cases

Total
Lost time
Restricted day and Lost work
NPRA Total NPRA Lost
Year Cases
cases
lost time cases
days
cases
time cases
2000
5.7
1.3
2.6
41.9
1.8
0.4
2001
5.5
1.4
2.2
54.9
1.8
0.4
2002
4.0
1.3
2.1
44.4
1.6
0.4
2003
7.2
2.1
4.4
54.0
1.5
0.4
2004
7.0
2.1
3.4
22.0
1.2
0.3
2005
7.4
2.7
4.2
126.0
1.1
0.3
2006
4.2
0.7
1.9
6.3
0.9
0.2
2007
3.1
0.7
1.4
17.6
0.9
0.3
2008
3.2
1.4
1.8
18.8
0.7
0.2
2009
2.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
1.1
0.8
Note. From unpublished data, NCRA Safety Department Database. McPherson, KS: NCRA.
Retrieved April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission.; NPRA = National Petroleum Refining
Association

8.0
7.2

7.0

Incident Rate

6.0

5.7

Total
Cases

7.4
7.0

Lost Time
Cases

5.5

5.0
4.4

4.2

4.0

4.0

3.4

3.0

1.0

1.8
1.3
0.4

2.2
1.8
1.4
0.4

2.1
1.6
1.3
0.4

2.1
1.5
0.4

0.0
2000

3.1

3.2

0.7

NPRA Lost
Time
Cases

2.7

2.6

2.0

3.3

Restricted
Day & Lost
Time
Cases
NPRA
Total
Cases

4.2

2001

2002

2003

2.1
1.2
0.3

2004

1.9
1.1
0.3

2005

1.4
0.9
0.7

0.9
0.7
0.2

2006

0.3

2007

1.8
1.4
0.7
0.2

2008

2.0

0.5
0.0

2009

2010

Year
Note. From unpublished data, NCRA Safety Department Database. McPherson, KS: NCRA.
Retrieved April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission.; NPRA = National Petroleum Refining
Association

Figure 1
National Cooperative Refinery Association Total Lost Time, Restricted Day, and
Lost Work Days Versus National Petroleum Refining Association Total Cases
Through May 2010
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2. Continuing the safety culture change process is necessary to improve
NCRA’s safety performance. As of April 2010, there were 3.3 recordable injuries
(see Table 7). The increase in recordable incidents and injuries in 2010
suggested the efforts to improve the safety culture at NCRA lost momentum. The
company received a NPRA Gold Award recognizing facilities with a 25% or
greater reduction in the Total Recordable Incidence Rate with no workplacerelated fatality of an employee or non-employee during 2009, as compared to the
average Total Recordable Incidence Rate for the three previous calendar years.
This recognition may have influenced managers and employees to feel they had
done enough to stay safe. However, to improve safety culture and safety
performance requires attention to detail and employee perceptions of safety
within the organization. Leaders must make a commitment to stay the course and
continue to build the capacity and structures to improve safety culture.
Table 7
National Cooperative Refinery Association Total Lost Time, Restricted Day, and
Lost Work Days Versus National Petrochemical and Refiner’s Association Total
Cases through May 2010

Total
Lost time
Restricted day and
Lost work NPRA Total
NPRA Lost
Year
Cases
cases
lost time cases
days
cases
time cases
2000
5.7
1.3
2.6
41.9
1.8
0.4
2001
5.5
1.4
2.2
54.9
1.8
0.4
2002
4.0
1.3
2.1
44.4
1.6
0.4
2003
7.2
2.1
4.4
54.0
1.5
0.4
2004
7.0
2.1
3.4
22.0
1.2
0.3
2005
7.4
2.7
4.2
126.0
1.1
0.3
2006
4.2
0.7
1.9
6.3
0.9
0.2
2007
3.1
0.7
1.4
17.6
0.9
0.3
2008
3.2
1.4
1.8
18.8
0.7
0.2
2009
2.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
1.1
0.8
2010
3.3
0.7
0.7
42.2
Note. From unpublished data, NCRA Safety Department Database. McPherson, KS: NCRA.
Retrieved April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission.; NPRA = National Petroleum Refining
Association
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During 2009, employees frequently raised the issue of improper use of fall
protection. The norms and assumptions around fall protection identified potential
risks to employees. Tragically, on February 9, 2010, a contractor worker was
killed on the refinery work site. A piece of scaffolding broke and the contractor
was not properly wearing fall protection. While the contractor was not a NCRA
employee, employees showed sympathy and concern. A joint hourly and salaried
committee was convened to investigate the accident and all use of scaffolding
was suspended for 2 weeks. The employees cited the safety culture change
process as the reason for the joint committee and the open, honest dialogue from
leaders. There was commitment from leaders to continue the safety culture
change efforts and to support a culture where employees learn from mistakes.
3. The guidance team and grassroots team structure created alignment
and helped sustain the safety culture change process. According to Dejoy
(2005), one of the strengths of culture-based safety was creating shared
leadership among employees and management to implement organizational
change. O’Reilly et al. (2005) provided research on leadership alignment
suggesting leaders at all levels should be considered to understand how they
were aligned in support of new strategies, specifically at intermediate levels. The
research findings suggested higher levels of alignment around the safety culture
change process from safety culture “team members” versus “non- team
members.”
From an organizational design perspective, Simon and Frazee (2005)
suggested safety culture change could be designed as both top-down and
bottom-up in approach. The safety culture guidance team at NCRA, comprised of
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hourly and salaried leaders, vice presidents, supervisors, and union leaders
structurally created alignment vertically within the organization. Membership on
the guidance team was carefully thought out and agreed upon jointly by
management and union leadership. The heterogeneity of employee levels
allowed the guidance team to look collectively at leadership within the refinery.
The safety culture team structure created shared ownership of the process and
joint participation from employee levels. The structure was able to be maximized
following the contractor fatality in February 2010. Grassroots team 5 planned a
safety culture change project aimed at changing the norms and assumptions
related to fall protection. Its objective was to create the norm that all employees
wear fall protection every time fall protection was needed.
The membership of four safety culture grassroots teams in April 2009
were made up of mostly hourly employees with one salaried supervisor and one
member of the guidance team functioning as the coach (Simon & Cistaro, 2009).
Again, the organization design created vertical alignment and allowed for
collective thought to be considered as the safety culture change process was
implemented. The survey data suggested alignment was created through the
team structure as evidenced by the higher positive responses by “team
members” than “non team members.”
In organizations that are peer-like and collaborative, similar to the
guidance team and grassroots team structure, Drath et al. (2008) suggested a
new definition for leadership was needed to inform leaders’ actions beyond
leadership, followers, and shared goals. Drath et al. (2008) stated that leadership
should focus on direction, alignment, and commitment as short-term criterion,
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which should be seen as an iterative process to produce long-term goals. Both
the grassroots teams and the guidance team assessed their effectiveness in
September 2009 during a team health check. The team health check allowed
team members to assess how their team was functioning and the effectiveness
of their safety culture change project. The grassroots teams recognized how not
following the team ground rules and not adhering to team roles and
responsibilities impacted their effectiveness. Additionally, the grassroots teams
identified they had not been following their initial project plan and had lost
direction. The process reflected the creation of direction, alignment, and
commitment as short-term goals for team members to improve safety
performance at NCRA.
4. Leadership alignment dialogues for supervisors impacted the
supervisors’ perceptions of safety. The research findings found salaried
employees responded more positively than hourly employees on the paper
survey. The principle of leadership alignment was more nuanced at lower levels
of management than at the upper management levels (Guth & Macmillan, 1986).
Within the safety culture change process, leadership alignment dialogues
addressed issues of horizontal and vertical alignment between supervisors and
upper management, but not with hourly employees.
In the group interviews, salaried employees commented on the impact of
the leadership alignment dialogues. Salaried employees believed upper
management allowed for open and honest dialogue about safety issues and
demonstrated leadership by apologizing for mistakes.

54
Additionally, Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) were the first to study the
effect of leadership on safety records and demonstrated the value of the
relationship between group leaders and their superiors and the positive impact
on employee and group safety performance. Salaried employees noticed an
increase in communication about safety at daily meetings and open and honest
communication at the leadership alignment dialogues. Direction, alignment, and
commitment were being created around the safety culture change process as a
result of the improved relationship between supervisors and upper management
at the leadership alignment dialogue sessions and in daily meetings.
Recommendations to Managers
The research findings inform discussions of future recommendations to
managers seeking to create vertical and horizontal alignment within a safety
culture change process. For instance, it is unknown if safety culture team
membership causes greater understanding of "role of teams," or if those
individuals with pre-existing greater understanding of "role of teams" were
thereby more likely to join a team. Although the directionality of this association
remains unknown, results suggested the following recommendations.
1. Team membership should be encouraged and more widely
implemented as a follow-up to the data findings, suggesting team members were
more aligned than non-team members. Team membership encouraged
participation and collaboration from employees in the overall safety process at
NCRA. The cross-functional teams created a networked group of employees able
to address specific norms and assumptions within the NCRA safety culture.
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2. Prior to selecting team members, a team member skill matrix should be
created for heterogeneous teams, identifying team member skills and employees
who are informal leaders and influencers.
3. Given the survey data showing salaried employees responded more
positively than hourly employees, managers should continue the leadership
alignment dialogue workshops. Beyond the 18 managers currently participating
in the workshops at NCRA, the remaining managers should begin the workshops
within 6 months to maintain continuity in the safety culture change effort.
4. The practice of supervisors making personal commitments to safety and
being accountable to their peers should become standard practice for
evaluations. One of the deliverables to the leadership alignment dialogue
workshops was supervisors making personal commitments to safety. Supervisor
interviews suggested the commitments impacted safety performance. Data
should be gathered from peers and supervised employees as well as self-reports
as to whether the personal commitments were fulfilled. The practice allowed
supervisors to be conscious of their actions and the messages communicated
around safety.
Recommendations to Organization Development Professionals
1. It is recommended the alignment survey be given to specific units within
the company instead of distributing a company-wide survey. This would allow for
targeted interventions in specific units at the refinery based on the level of true
alignment, skewed alignment, or forced alignment. Not only would targeting
specific units be cost effective to clients, but also the organization development
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professionals and internal culture change champions would be able to generate
useful learning data to be used with future company units.
2. To create horizontal alignment of hourly employees, similar to the
leadership alignment dialogues for supervisors, it is recommended that
leadership alignment dialogues be completed with targeted units. Based on
Zohar’s (2002b) research, suggesting transformational leadership influenced
safety performance when supervisors provided encouragement and showed
concern for others, the alignment dialogues would target the relationship
between supervisors and hourly employees. The alignment dialogues for hourly
employees and supervisors would assess whether the supervisors’ priorities
align with the organization’s strategic priorities to successfully implement safety
policies and procedures (Zohar & Luria, 2005).
3. A formal structure to coach upper management on safety culture
change communications and actions should be created. The coaching would
focus on creating alignment, direction, and commitment to sustain the safety
culture change efforts, while dialoguing about short-term and long-term goals.
Upper management would have bi-monthly calls with a safety culture change
coach and specifically focus on leadership actions designed to create alignment,
both horizontally and vertically within the organization.
Limitations
1. Administering a voluntary, paper survey to employees showed a limited
response rate. In the future, an electronic survey may lend itself to a higher
response rate and include the majority of refinery employees. More specifically,
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the language used for the survey questions could be refined and piloted before
administering future surveys.
2. The research study gathered the qualitative data using a note-taking
method instead of recording the interviews. The qualitative data were influenced
by the interviewer’s biases and the accuracy of the respondents’ memories.
Future research may include recording the interviews to allow for a researcher to
analyze the specific language used by employees, working from the perspective
that language is the central feature of the socio-cultural situation (Punch, 2005).
3. Lastly, the research study occurred over a 2-month time period, limiting
the ability to collect data at multiple points within the safety culture change
process. Collecting data at multiple points over the course of at least 1 year
would allow for more data to be analyzed. Specific interventions, like leadership
alignment dialogues, supervisor dialogues in specific units, and upper
management coaching, could be assessed in relation to a larger time frame.
Suggestions for Further Research
1. When planning further research, it is helpful to recognize addressing
employee needs should focus on structural groupings, not years of experience
within the refinery. It was surprising to find that demographic factor 3 lacked
association with the constructs of interest (“alignment” and “role of teams”). The
stepwise regression model-building technique would have revealed any
significant relationship between the composites and this factor, even if it were
less strongly correlated than connections with other demographic factors. For this
set of data, it can be argued there was no evidence to suggest any relationship
between duration of employment and the workplace attitudes measured. Given
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this data, further research regarding supervisor and employee relationships and
grassroots and guidance team experiences could provide insights into
demographic factors influencing the process.
2. Also, it is unknown if the September 2009 team health check
intervention created direction, alignment, and commitment within the safety
culture change process. The team health check intervention was designed to
calibrate and align the grassroots and guidance teams. The anecdotal feedback
from team members and coaches was positive. A longitudinal study on the
effectiveness of team health check interventions within the safety culture change
process is suggested.
3. Lastly, continued research on leadership alignment within a safety
culture change process is suggested at NCRA and other client organizations to
identify leaders’ actions, employees’ commitment, and overall safety
performance. Further research is needed to discover how alignment, direction,
and commitment are built through employee networks. A longitudinal study on
leadership alignment is suggested to provide enough data to track alignment
throughout a safety culture change process, which lasts 5 to 7 years at a single
site.
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Please circle the best answer to each survey item.
1. Which best describes you?
1. Hourly
2. Salaried
2. Which best describes you?
1. Member of a grassroots team
2. Member of the guidance team
3. Neither
3. How many years have you been employed at NCRA?
1. 0 to 5 years
2. 6 to 10 years
3. 11 to 20 years
4. 20+ years
4. What unit best identifies where you work?
1. Operations
2. Maintenance
3. Safety
5. I think the union and salaried employees are working together in the safety
culture change efforts.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
6. Hourly employees show commitment to the safety culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
7. Management and supervisors show commitment to the safety culture change
process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
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8. I understand my role in the overall safety culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
9. I know what the guidance team and grassroots teams do.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
10. The grassroots teams communicate the results of their safety culture change
projects.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
11. The guidance team regularly communicates the goals of the safety culture
change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
12. Management and supervisors regularly communicate the importance of
safety culture in our daily work routines.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
13. Management and supervision encourage employees to share safety
concerns and report near misses.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
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14. Management and supervisors are on the same page when they talk about the
safety culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
15. The grassroots teams’ projects have made a difference in the safety of our
employees.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
16. The guidance team projects have made a difference in the overall safety of
the refinery.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
17. Management and supervision see the safety culture change as a strategic
priority at NCRA.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
18. Our community expects safety to be our first priority.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
19. Supervisors and management share the same high level of commitment to
the safety culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
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20. Management and supervision believe safety is #1.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
21. Management and supervision share the same priorities when safety and
production seem to be in conflict.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
22. Management and supervision share the same belief about what is acceptable
and unacceptable risk levels.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
23. For the most part, I feel we are aligned as a work group/unit around the
safety culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
24. Management and supervision take the time to address comments and
concerns regarding the safety culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
25. The leadership focuses attention and resources on the safety culture change
process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true
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26. The grassroots teams and guidance team structure supports the safety
culture change process.
1. Not true
2. Seldom true
3. Occasionally true
4. Mostly true
5. Definitely true

71

Appendix B
Consent Form

72
Dear NCRA employee,
My name is Nicholas Krump, and I work with Culture Change Consultants aiming
to create a premier culture of safety at NCRA. As a graduate student at
Pepperdine University, I am interested in learning your perspectives on how we
are doing in regard to creating a culture of safety. Specifically, the objectives of
my research thesis are to determine:
1. the degree of leadership alignment for this initiative
2. what actions have contributed to creating leadership alignment
3. necessary actions to move towards stronger leadership alignment.
Specifics of the research include:
•
•
•

The survey, focus groups, and interviews are voluntary.
Your job status will not be affected whether you participate or not; you can
choose to withdraw at any time.
The data collected will remain anonymous. Your name will never be
associated with any opinions.

If you have questions regarding the study, please contact Miriam Y. Lacey, Ph.D.
at [contact information omitted].
If you would like to participate in helping us look at improving our safety culture,
please sign below to show your consent.
Thank you,
Nicholas Krump
_______________________
Participant’s Signature
_______________________
Participant’s Printed Name

________________________
Date

